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Christopher McCabe, Karl Claxton, Aki Tsuchiya
The growing number and costs of drugs for rare diseases are straining healthcare budgets. Decisions
on funding these treatments need to be made on a sound basis
Cost effectiveness plays an important part in current
decisions about the funding of health technologies.
Drugs for rare disease (orphan drugs) are often
expensive to produce and, by definition, will benefit only
small numbers of patients. Several countries have put
measures in place to safeguard research and develop-
ment of orphan drugs, but few get close to meeting the
cost effectiveness criteria for funding by healthcare pro-
viders.We examine the justifications for special status for
rare diseases and ask whether the cost effectiveness of
drugs for rare or very rare diseases should be treated dif-
ferently from that of other drugs and interventions.
Current practice
The citizen’s council of the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) was recently
asked to consider whether the NHS should be
prepared to pay premium prices for drugs to treat
patients with very rare diseases.1 It recommended that
the NHS should consider paying premium prices
based on three criteria: the severity of the disease, evi-
dence of health gain, and whether the disease is life
threatening.1 The decision by the Department of
Health to ring fence funding for enzyme replacement
therapy for lysosomal disorders, with expected annual
costs above £100 000 ($180 000, €150 000) per patient
for life, suggests that central government also currently
believes that premium prices should be paid.2
NICE has conducted a feasibility study to explore
whether its current processes and methods of technol-
ogy appraisal can be applied to the appraisal of
ultra-orphan drugs (those for diseases with a prevalence
of 0.18/10 000 or less).3 It has not yet stated whether it
will recommend that treatments for very rare diseases
should have special status during appraisal.
To date, the institute has evaluated only one
ultra-orphan drug, imatinib for gastrointestinal stro-
mal tumours. The estimated cost per quality adjusted
life year was £30 000, and its use was approved.4 Other
ultra-orphan drugs may also not require special status
to be considered cost effective (for example, anegralide
for essential thrombocytopenia). However, these are
likely to be the exception rather than the rule (table 1).
The four biotech therapies licensed for the treatment
of ultra-orphan diseases in the UK cost over £58 000
per person a year. The four ultra-orphan products in
clinical development are also biotech products and
likely to have similar price tags. These prices make it
impossible for these treatments to meet conventional
criteria for cost effectiveness.5
Orphan status
Several jurisdictions have established regulations for
orphan drugs. The United States was the first to do so,
through the 1983 US Orphan Drugs Act.6 The
European Union did not establish orphan drugs status
until 2000. The precise prevalence threshold varies
widely, with the United States having the most
generous and Australia the least. (table 2).
The justifications for providing special status to
orphan drugs are ambiguous and differ between juris-
dictions. The US Orphan Drugs Act states: “Some
promising drugs will not be developed and it is in the
public interest to provide such changes and incentives
for the development of orphan drugs.”6 This suggests
that the justification for special status is based on the
cost of production and the value of innovation. The
European Union legislation provides a subtly different
but equally ambiguous rationale: “Patients suffering
from rare conditions should be entitled to the same
quality of treatment as other patients.”7 In this case the
rationale seems to be equity.
A range of special measures are in place to support
research and development of orphan drugs. These
generally include public funding for basic science, tax
incentives, extended patent protection, and market
exclusivity.6 7 The issue faced by bodies such as NICE is
whether a similar special status should be enshrined in
decisions about allocating resources.
Estimating cost effectiveness
The evidence base for orphan drugs is suggested to be
too sparse to allow estimates of cost effectiveness.3
Special status for drugs for rare diseases such as neurofibromatosis
may be unsustainable
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However, estimates for all drugs and interventions
synthesise evidence from a variety of sources, including
randomised controlled trials, observational studies,
and expert judgment. The resulting decision on fund-
ing must reflect the amount and quality of the evidence
so that the decision is made in knowledge of the uncer-
tainty around the estimate of cost effectiveness. Thus,
even when the central estimate of the cost effectiveness
is below the threshold for funding, if there is a large
amount of uncertainty, the decision maker may still
choose not to fund and await more evidence to reduce
the uncertainty. The methods currently used by NICE
are well suited to this.5 The institute has already
appraised drugs for 15 rare diseases using the same
methods and decision criteria as for other appraisals
(see bmj.com).5
The level of evidence required to support a
decision to adopt a technology should depend on the
consequences of the uncertainty—that is, if an
uncertain decision proves to be wrong, how much will
society lose in terms of resources and health outcomes
forgone? The expected cost of uncertainty is largely
determined by the number of patients affected. There-
fore the existing framework of evaluation and appraisal
will accept a lower level of evidence for orphan drugs
because the cost of uncertainty will be lower. Existing
methods not only cope with the lower levels of
evidence available for orphan drugs, they support the
use of lower evidential standards for orphan drugs.8
Cost of production and value of
innovation
The justification for special status for orphan drugs is
often couched in terms of the costs of developing a drug
for a rare disease relative to the small market and conse-
quently the high costs of treatment for each patient.6 7 9
The real costs faced by the pharmaceutical industry are
open to argument, but the fundamental question is
whether society should subsidise the private sector to
invest in the development of technologies when the cost
to society exceeds the value it places on the health gain
produced. If the answer is no, then the costs of produc-
tion cannot justify any special treatment.
However, this analysis requires the private sector to
fully anticipate all the future benefits and returns from
developing treatments for rare diseases. The private
sector may not fully account for these in its investment
decisions if it discounts the future benefits more highly
than society (because of taxation and risk), or if it fears
that the longer term benefits and returns may be
recouped by others. In these situations the public
sector should and does intervene through directly
funding research, tax incentives, and patent law to pro-
tect intellectual property rights.6 7 Existing measures
may be inadequate, but even if that is true, poor incen-
tives are not restricted to rare diseases. Any reasons for
further intervention would apply to all investments in
research and development. Therefore, the arguments
based on the value of innovation or the cost of produc-
tion cannot provide justification for special status.
Valuation of benefits
The argument must therefore rest on the way the
immediate benefits from the treatment of rare diseases
are measured and valued. The value placed on an
intervention depends on the objective of the
healthcare system. The often cited objective of maxim-
ising health gains is consistent with the view that clini-
cal need can be regarded as the capacity to benefit
from an intervention and that every individual’s heath
gain is valued equally. This view of need, and the
implicit view of equity, is embedded in cost
effectiveness analysis.5 But it is not consistent with the
European Union’s legislation stating that all patients
should have equal access to the same quality of care.7 If
the objective is to maximise health outcomes, the cost
effectiveness of drugs for rare diseases should be
treated in the same way as that of other technologies.
A range of alternative objectives and equity princi-
ples are possible. These include equality of health out-
comes, equality of resource use, or allocation of
resources in proportion to the severity of the individu-
al’s ill health. However, adopting a different objective,
or view of need and equity will have profound implica-
tions for allocation of resources throughout the
healthcare system, not just for the treatment of rare
diseases.Moreover, these competing concepts of equity
are not specific to rare diseases and cannot justify their
special treatment. Indeed, rare diseases may not be
particularly advantaged or disadvantaged by alterna-
tive objectives and principles of equity.
Measurement and valuation of health
gain
Measuring improvements in health outcome, in a
manner which adequately captures all the effects
valued by the patient, is challenging. Quality adjusted
life years may not capture all that is valued in some cir-
cumstances. For example, it has been argued that treat-
ment should be valued independently of any
improvements in health when no other active
treatment is available,10 when an intervention may
arrest a disease process or preserve life for a time, or
when prognosis is particularly poor.9 11–14 Another
argument is that the valuation of health outcome
Table 1 Examples of ultra-orphan drugs
Condition Drug Status
Annual cost/
patient (£)
Congenital sucrase isomaltase deficiency Sacrosidase Licensed 3 800
Essential thrombocytopenia Anagrelide Licensed 4 295
Gastrointestinal stromal tumours Imatinib Licensed 28 500
Gaucher’s disease Miglustat Licensed 58 400
Gaucher’s disease Imiglucerase Licensed 70 100
Fabry’s disease Agalsidase Licensed 109 600
Mucopolysaccharidosis 1 Laronidase Licensed 311 000
Hereditary tyrosinaemia (type 1) Orfadin (organic chemical) Licensed Unknown
Hunter syndrome Idursulfas Early clinical trials Unknown
Mucopolysaccharidosis VI Aryplase Licence applied for Unknown
Niemann-Pick’s disease OGT 923 Early clinical trials Unknown
Table 2 Definitions of orphan diseases
Country
No of affected
individuals
Prevalence
(per 10 000 population)
United States <200 000 7.5
Japan <50 000 4.0
Australia <2 000 1.1
European Union <215 000 5.0
United Kingdom (ultra-orphan) <1000 0.18
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should reflect the fact that known lives tend to be valued
more highly than unknown statistical lives.15 This may be
particularly relevant to diseases with a strong genetic
component, when people who will develop the disease
can be identified. Many rare diseases reflect some of
these issues, but they are also relevant to more common
diseases and so cannot justify special status. The appro-
priate response to these issues is to conduct the
methodological and empirical work required to improve
our measurement and valuation of outcome across dis-
eases, whether rare or common.
Equity and rarity
The justification for special status for rare diseases must
rest on the question: should we value the health gain to
two individuals differently because one individual has a
common disorder and the other has a rare disorder?
Consider two groups of people who have similar
diseases (J and K). J is a rare disease (1 per 10 000) and
K a more common disease (1 per 1000). Imagine these
people have the same personal characteristics, the
same prognosis without treatment, and the same
capacity to benefit from the treatments. Is it acceptable
that people with J do not get treatment simply because
they have a rare disease? Most would say not. However,
now imagine that the cost of the orphan drug for J is
higher than the treatment for K. Suppose the cost of
treating one case of J is £1000, the cost of treating one
case of K is £100, and the budget is £1000. Then the
real choice posed by orphan status is between treating
1 person with J or 10 people with K. To argue that the
patient with J should get treatment implies that that
health gain of people with J should be valued 10 times
higher than that of people with K. The idea that
decisions should be made based on valuing health out-
come more highly for no other reason than rarity of
the condition seems unsustainable and incompatible
with other equity principles and theories of justice.
Why should a person’s health be valued less simply
because the condition is not rare?
Sustainability
There seem to be no sustainable reasons why the cost
effectiveness of drugs for rare diseases should be
judged differently from that of other healthcare
technologies. While orphan drugs were rare, health-
care systems were able to deal with them in an ad hoc
manner. But there are now over 6000 orphan diseases
with over 200 treatments approved by the US Food
and Drugs Administration and 64 trials currently
sponsored by the US Office of Orphan Products
Development.16 Genomics is expected to disaggregate
currently prevalent diseases into many genetically
defined distinct conditions. Orphan status is thus likely
to become increasingly common.
Orphan status is maintained for drugs with
multiple indications ( M Hafner, Royal College of Phy-
sicians conference onmanaging rare diseases, London,
5 October 2004). This enables companies to take a
strategic approach to the development process in
order to extract the maximum amount of public
financing and minimise the financial risk. Given the
commercial imperative to maximise revenue and mini-
mise costs, it is reasonable to expect further growth in
the number of rare diseases and orphan drugs. The
pharmaceutical industry already seems to have identi-
fied the strategic opportunity that the licensing legisla-
tion for orphan drugs represents.17 Any special status
granted to orphan drugs in decisions about allocating
resources is also likely to be fully exploited.
Special status for orphan drugs in resource alloca-
tion will avoid difficult and unpopular decisions, but it
may impose substantial and increasing costs on the
healthcare system. The costs will be borne by other,
unknown patients, with more common diseases who
will be unable to access effective and cost effective
treatment as a result.
The arguments advanced in this paper benefited greatly from
discussions with Ron Akehurst, Pippa Anderson, John Brazier,
Anthony O’Hagan, and Mark Sculpher. David Barnett kindly
gave permission for the use of the figure on bmj.com.
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Commissioning for rare diseases: view from the frontline
Amanda Burls, Daphne Austin, David Moore
Deciding whether to fund treatments that do good one by one tends to lead to a positive decision.
However, this can cause wider harmful effects, as West Midlands’ experience in the funding of
enzyme replacement therapy for lysosomal storage diseases shows
Orphan drugs tend to be expensive for two reasons.
Firstly, development and production costs need to be
offset in low volume sales, and, secondly, the monopoly
position of manufacturers (entrenched within legisla-
tion to provide an incentive to develop treatments for
rare conditions) permits large profit margins. Histori-
cally, the NHS has paid for expensive orphan drugs. It
could do so because treatments for these diseases were
so rare that the effect on health services was negligible.
This policy is increasingly being questioned. As more
and more expensive orphan drugs come on to the
market, the impact on other health services is
becoming substantial. In addition, since the establish-
ment of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
(NICE) in 1999, the idea that technologies should
reach minimum standards of cost effectiveness has
become widely accepted.
However, efficiency is not the only principle in
resource allocation: we also value equity and caring.
Indeed, the abrogation of the principle of efficiency (by
more generous reimbursement of treatments for rare
diseases) is usually defended on such grounds.
However, as we move towards more explicitness in
decision making, which requires us to show that princi-
ples are being applied consistently, incoherence and
tensions within the equity argument have begun to
surface. McCabe and colleagues cite various reasons
given in support of a more generous reimbursement
policy for orphan drugs and refute each on theoretical
grounds.1 We approach the issue from a different per-
spective, that of the frontline commissioner. We tell the
story of what happened during 2002-5, when commis-
sioners responsible for health services in the West Mid-
lands tried to approach such decisions in an explicit,
justifiable manner.
The context
In England, primary care trusts are responsible for
securing health services for their local populations. For
high cost, low volume activities, trusts are expected to
collaborate with neighbouring trusts to commission
specialised services.2 Services covering populations of
3-6 million are commissioned regionally, whereas
services with a national caseload under 400 tend to be
commissioned nationally through the National
Specialist Commissioning Advisory Group.3
The question
The decision facing West Midlands concerned enzyme
replacement therapy for lysosomal storage diseases.
These are a group of rare inherited deficiencies in
enzymes that degrade cellular material. Treatment
aims to replace the deficient enzyme, thereby prevent-
ing accumulation of material and consequent ill health.
In 2001, the West Midlands was funding enzyme
replacement therapy for Gaucher’s disease, the only
lysosomal storage disease that had a specific treatment
at the time. In 2002, a new enzyme was licensed for
Fabry’s disease, and primary care trusts needed to
decide whether to fund it. No comprehensive
framework for making such decisions was in place.
Although the evidence supporting enzyme
replacement therapy is thin, this was not the main
issue. Even if the drugs were 100% effective, the
question remained whether they produced enough
benefit to justify their cost, given other claims on
resources. Over 5000 diseases are classified as rare in
Spleen of patient with Gaucher’s disease: enzyme replacement therapy can prevent
accumulation of glucocerebroside
CN
RI
/S
PL
Education and debate
West Midlands
Health Technology
Assessment
Collaboration,
Department of
Public Health and
Epidemiology,
University of
Birmingham,
Birmingham
B15 2TT
Amanda Burls
senior clinical lecturer
in public health and
epidemiology
David Moore
senior research fellow
West Midlands
Specialised Services
Agency,
Birmingham
B16 9RG
Daphne Austin
consultant in public
health medicine
Correspondence to:
A Burls
A.J.Burls@bham.ac.uk
BMJ 2005;331:1019–21
1019BMJ VOLUME 331 29 OCTOBER 2005 bmj.com
 on 20 January 2006 bmj.comDownloaded from 
